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PROSECUTING MEMBERS OF ISIS  
FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
CODY CORLISS* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article examines the potential for war-crime charges against members of ISIS for 
“culture crimes” in Syria and Iraq, specifically for group members’ participation in the in-
tentional destruction of cultural and historic sites in the Middle East. This Article begins by 
tracing the history of legal efforts to protect cultural property and the recent developments in 
international law that have transformed “culture crimes” into chargeable war crimes. After 
examining the history of legal efforts to protect property, this Article turns its focus to ISIS 
and the group’s role in destroying cultural property that it deems antithetical to its brand of 
Islam and its use of looting historic monuments and the sale of antiquities to further itself 
financially. Following this primer, this Article examines the available avenues of accounta-
bility, the potential forums for prosecution (whether via domestic prosecution, an ad hoc 
international tribunal, or the International Criminal Court), and how each of those forums 
may be used to prosecute ISIS members for their destruction of culture.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On May 21, 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)1 cap-
tured the historic city of Palmyra, Syria, one of the best-preserved 
sites from antiquity.2 Although ISIS initially declared it would not 
destroy Palmyra’s historic ruins,3 its promise soon proved false.4 ISIS 
used explosives to demolish the ancient Temple of Baalshamin, a 
monument built over 2,000 years ago and originally dedicated to the 
Phoenician god Baalshamin.5 A week later, ISIS leveled the Temple 
of Bel, a temple dedicated to the Semitic god Baal dating from 32 
A.D., and a site considered to be one of the most important religious 
monuments in the Middle East.6 Archaeologists, political leaders, and 
lovers of history mourned the losses of  these monuments, other his-
toric structures in Palmyra, and other places in the Middle East, call-
                                                                                                                       
 1. The author will use “ISIS” to describe the militant group occupying portions of 
Iraq and Syria. ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), or Daesh has its roots as an al-Qaeda splinter group formed in Iraq in 2004. 
For a more thorough discussion of the rise of ISIS and its expansion in Iraq and Syria, see 
CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & CARLA E. HUMUD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43612, THE 
ISLAMIC STATE AND U.S. POLICY 23 (2017) (describing ISIS leaders’ vision of creating a 
caliphate in the Middle East); Milena Sterio, The Applicability of the Humanitarian In-
tervention “Exception” to the Middle Eastern Refugee Crisis: Why the International Com-
munity Should Intervene Against ISIS, 38 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 325, 326-28 
(2015); ISIS Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-
facts/ [https://perma.cc/S2GP-6K4A] (last updated Dec. 12, 2017). 
 2. ISIS Fast Facts, supra note 1. 
 3. In a radio interview, ISIS’s military commander in Palmyra, Abu Laith al-Saody, 
suggested that ISIS would only destroy the historic artifacts that constituted “idols” and 
that historic buildings would be preserved. Kareem Shaheen, Syria: ISIS Releases Foot-
age of Palmyra Ruins Intact and ‘Will Not Destroy Them’, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/27/isis-releases-footage-of-palmyra-ruins-
intact [https://perma.cc/DM2Q-G5RY]. 
 4. Director-General of UNESCO Irina Bokova Firmly Condemns the Destruction of 
Palymra’s Ancient Temple of Baalshamin, Syria, UNESCO (Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter 
UNESCO I], http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1339/ [https://perma.cc/28HA-3T2D] (condemn-
ing the destruction of the Baalshamin temple dating to the Roman era and calling its de-
struction “a new war crime and an immense loss for the Syrian people and for humanity” 
(quoting Director-General, UNESCO)); Director-General Irina Bokova Expresses Conster-
nation at the Destruction of the Temple of Bel in Palmyra, UNESCO (Sept. 1, 2015), 
https://en.unesco.org/news/director-general-irina-bokova-expresses-consternation-
destruction-temple-bel-palmyra [https://perma.cc/Z47P-Q9EF] (“Bokova . . . condemned the 
destruction of the Temple of Bel in Palmyra, one of the most important 1st century CE 
religious monuments in the Middle East . . . .”). 
 5. Liam Stack, ISIS Blows Up Ancient Temple at Syria’s Palmyra Ruins, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/world/middleeast/islamic-state-blows-
up-ancient-temple-at-syrias-palmyra-ruins.html. 
 6. Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, Palmyra Temple Was Destroyed by ISIS, U.N. 
Confirms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/world/ 
middleeast/isis-militants-severely-damage-temple-of-baal-in-palmyra.html.  
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ing their destruction “a catastrophe,”7 “cultural carnage,”8 and “cul-
tural barbarism at its worst.”9 Irina Bokova, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) at the time, used another term to describe ISIS’s de-
struction: a “war crime.”10 
 The phenomenon of the destruction of cultural property in both 
wartime and peacetime is a common story that stretches to the earli-
est days of civilization. In wartime, cultural destruction was used as 
a means to further a repressor’s ideology, destroy the social fabric of 
those who were invaded, and obliterate the hallmarks of a previous 
regime.11  The notion that such destruction could lead to criminal 
prosecution is a recent development in international law, although 
the first international documents on the preservation of cultural 
property in times of war were drafted in the late nineteenth centu-
ry.12 Since that time, there have been efforts—and pushbacks—on the 
international normative level to punish perpetrators who have inten-
tionally destroyed cultural property in times of war. 
 This Article examines the potential for war-crime charges against 
members of ISIS for “culture crimes,” namely the group’s intentional 
destruction of cultural property. This Article begins by tracing the 
history of legal efforts to protect cultural property and the evolutions 
                                                                                                                       
 7. Palmyra’s Temple of Bel destroyed, Says UN, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2015)  
(quoting Maamoun Abdul Karim, Head of Syrian Dep’t of Antiquities & Museums), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34111092 [https://perma.cc/BFU6-EVKN]. 
 8. Jethro Mullen & Schams Elwazer, ISIS Destroys Arch of Triumph in Syria’s Pal-
myra Ruins, CNN (quoting Markus Hilgert), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/05/middleeast/ 
syria-isis-palmyra-arch-of-triumph/index.html [https://perma.cc/R5FV-9KSK] (last updated 
Oct. 6, 2015, 10:11 AM). In addition to destroying these beloved structures, ISIS beheaded 
Khaled al-Asaad, the beloved eighty-two-year-old Syrian archaeologist who had looked 
after Palmyra’s ruins for four decades, and hung his body in public. Hassan Hassan, Be-
heading of Khaled al-Asaad, Keeper of Palmyra, Unites Syria in Condemnation, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 22, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/22/beheading-of-khaled-al-
asaad-keeper-of-palmyra-unites-syria-in-condemnation [https://perma.cc/33M4-UGAS]. 
 9. John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at Threats to Cultural Heritage in Iraq 
and Syria Event (Sept. 22, 2014), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/ 
231992.htm [https://perma.cc/6DZS-XSSZ]. 
 10. UNESCO I, supra note 4.  
 11. See, e.g., CAROLINE EHLERT, PROSECUTING THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROP-
ERTY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (2013). 
 12. Although never ratified, the first international document on the protection of cul-
tural property in wartime was the 1874 Declaration of Brussels. The Tsar of Russia con-
vened a Diplomatic Conference in Brussels in July 1874 with the objection of deliberating 
on an international agreement respecting the laws and customs of war. Article 17 instruct-
ed, in part, that “[i]n such cases all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possi-
ble, buildings dedicated to art, science, or charitable purposes, hospitals, and places where 
the sick and wounded are collected provided they are not being used at the time for mili-
tary purposes.” Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War, art. 17, Aug. 27, 1874 [hereinafter Declaration of Brussels]. 
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in international law leading to the criminalization and the potential 
prosecution of those who destroy cultural and historic sites. After ex-
amining the legal grounds for the prosecution of ISIS members for 
the destruction of cultural property in the Middle East, this Article 
examines ISIS and its aims, including its destruction of cultural 
property that it deems antithetical to its brand of Islam. Following 
this primer, this Article examines the appropriate forum for that 
prosecution. First, this Article examines the possibility of domestic 
prosecution in Syria and Iraq or in the home jurisdictions of ISIS 
members who are not from those two nations. Next, it examines the 
use of an ad hoc international tribunal where the destruction of cul-
tural property could be charged as a war crime. Finally, this Article 
examines the International Criminal Court (ICC) as the jurisdiction 
to try ISIS members, focusing on Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC13 and the recent precedent-setting case that offers ICC prosecu-
tors a clear path to prosecute perpetrators of cultural destruction. 
Although the Rome Statute and case law suggest a path to prosecute 
ISIS members for cultural destruction, ICC jurisdiction remains a 
hurdle. The final Section examines the various ways to bring ISIS 
members to justice before the ICC. 
II.   THE PRE-WORLD WAR II HISTORY OF THE PROTECTION OF  
CULTURAL PROPERTY 
 The protection of cultural property has long been intertwined with 
the laws of war.14 Polybius of Athens, a third to second century B.C.E. 
historian, is often considered the earliest advocate for cultural pro-
                                                                                                                       
 13. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int’l 
Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 14. A number of scholars have addressed the historical evolution of the protection of 
cultural property within greater scholarly works. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections 
on Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural Property, 10 SYRACUSE. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 281, 287-305 (1983) (examining the evolution of the protection of cultural 
property in times of war and peace); Joseph F. Edwards, Major Global Treaties for the Pro-
tection and Enjoyment of Art and Cultural Objects, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 919, 923-25 (1991) 
(examining major cultural protection treaties); Yaron Gottlieb, Criminalizing Destruction 
of Cultural Property: A Proposal for Defining New Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 857, 859-62, 880-95 (2005) (tracing the evolution of the law 
of protection of cultural property and advocating additional laws within the ICC); James A. 
R. Nafziger, UNESCO-Centered Management of International Conflict Over Cultural Prop-
erty, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1051, 1051-55 (1976) (examining the history of protection of cultural 
property in relation to the role of UNESCO); Stanislaw E. Nahlik, International Law and 
the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1070-76 
(1976) (examining early attempts to protect cultural property during armed conflict); Han-
nah G. He, Comment, Protecting Ancient Heritage in Armed Conflict: New Rules for Target-
ing Cultural Property During Conflict with ISIS, 30 MD. J. INT’L L. 168, 176-78 (2015) 
(tracing the evolution of the protection of cultural property and advocating a balancing 
between the preservation of cultural sites with military necessity). 
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tection during times of war.15 Later, such prohibitions against cultur-
al destruction gained additional currency during the Renaissance.16 
The first formal codification of the laws of war was drafted during the 
American Civil War.17 In 1863, Francis Lieber drafted his Instruc-
tions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field.18 Known as the Lieber Code, the document included the codifi-
cation of the doctrine of military necessity.19 The doctrine of military 
necessity recognized a limitation on a previous notion that all private 
or public property of the enemy could be confiscated for military 
use.20 The Lieber Code instead recognized “the distinction between 
the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile 
country itself, with its men in arms,” and noted “[t]he principle has 
been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be 
spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of 
war will admit.”21 Consequently, the newly enacted doctrine recog-
nized a general protection of property, including an explicit protec-
tion for churches, hospitals, and “museums of the fine arts, or of a 
scientific character.”22 
 The influence of the Lieber Code’s protection of property extended 
beyond the American border, with the Code forming a basis for the 
1874 Brussels Declaration, the first intergovernmental codification of 
the laws of war.23 Although the Brussels Declaration was never rati-
fied, the Declaration influenced subsequent efforts to codify the laws 
of war. For example, international legal scholars at Oxford, England 
approved a manual on the law of land warfare, commonly known as 
the Oxford Manual, with roots in the Brussels Declaration. 24  Alt-
                                                                                                                       
 15. John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 831, 833 n.7 (1986). 
 16. See JIŘÍ TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 4-10 (1996).  
 17. ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 18 
(2006). 
 18. Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field, General Orders No. 100, art. 31 (promulgated Apr. 24, 1863) (Washington, Gov-
ernment Printing Office 1898) [hereinafter The Lieber Code]. 
 19. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber, and the Laws of War: The Origins and Lim-
its of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92. AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 215 (1998). 
 20. Id. at 226. 
 21. The Lieber Code, supra note 18, art. 22. 
 22. Id. arts. 31, 34; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (Simon & Schuster eds., 2012). 
 23. See supra text accompanying note 12; see also Declaration of Brussels, supra note 
12; Carnahan, supra note 19, at 215 (noting that the Lieber Code formed the basis for the 
1874 Declaration of Brussels). 
 24. THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 139 (1998); INSTITUTE OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, OXFORD MANUAL ON THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1880), in THE LAWS 
OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCU-
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hough the Lieber Code and the Oxford Manual urged restraint con-
cerning civilian property, the strict legal position remained that the 
bombardment of civilian areas was permissible if the requirements of 
war necessitated such action.25 
 Endorsing the positions staked out in the never-ratified Brussels 
Declaration, the Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs 
of Wars on Land became the first international agreement on protect-
ing culturally-significant property to come into force. 26  The 1907 
Hague Convention provided for the protection of, among other things, 
“buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, 
[and] historic monuments.”27 This early protection against the de-
struction of cultural property was one of many topics in a greater 
document concerning the laws of belligerents. As would be the case 
with many international agreements concerning cultural property 
protection, punishment was carried out by the authorities of an of-
fender’s home nation.28 The result was often an uneven enforcement. 
 Most significantly, the 1907 Hague Convention yielded an im-
portant article that later developed into a broader duty to safeguard 
cultural property. Article 43, which established the general mandates 
for occupying forces, stated that an occupying authority had an obli-
gation to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety.”29 Although the drafters of 
such an article likely never envisioned its applicability to cultural 
property, the mandate would eventually come to stand for the obliga-
                                                                                                                  
MENTS 35 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1981); 1 THE LAW OF 
WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 25, 27 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972). 
 25. See O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 19. 
 26. Id. at 22-23.  
 27. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, UT.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. Article 27 to the 1907 
Hague Convention states: 
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far 
as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are col-
lected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is 
the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by 
distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand. 
 Id. 
 28. Merryman, supra note 15, at 835. 
 29. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 27, art. 43. As Anne-Marie Carstens notes, 
the term for “public order and safety” in the English text is “l’order et la vie publics” in the 
authoritative French version. Anne-Marie Carstens, The Hostilities-Occupation Dichotomy 
and Cultural Property in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 n.44 
(2016). She suggests that “public order and safety” would be more aptly translated as “pub-
lic order and civil life.” Id. 
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tion to preserve public order, including the protection of important 
cultural sites.30 
 During World War I and World War II, the warring parties made 
some effort to incorporate the 1907 Hague Convention rules, thereby 
resulting in some limited efforts to protect cultural property. As 
Anne-Marie Carstens notes, such duties of protection were typically 
rooted in occupied territories, such as during World War I when 
Germany dispatched museum specialists, archivists, and other ex-
perts to German-occupied territories on the Western and Eastern 
fronts as part of its Kunstchutz program.31 Germany’s Kunstchutz 
efforts, however, were not entirely altruistic. Instead, the Kunstchutz 
was largely conducted in response to public outcry stemming from 
Germany’s earlier destruction of cultural sites, such as its destruc-
tion of the city center in Kalisz, Poland; the university library in 
Leuven, Belgium; and the shelling of the Cathedral of Notre Dame in 
Reims, France―all of which occurred in the summer and fall of 
1914.32 As in the case of such destruction, the advent of aerial bomb-
ing and the realization of the military strategy of total war eclipsed 
the 1907 Hague Convention rules during World War I.33   
 Limited efforts to protect cultural property continued during 
World War II. The Axis Power instituted an initiative similar to the 
World War I German Kunstchutz program, but the initiative itself 
was generally ineffective and principally focused only on cultural pro-
tection of sites in southern and western Europe.34 Allied forces also 
established protections for cultural property, such as issuing orders 
for troops to protect cultural monuments and establishing a team of 
Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives specialist officers to facilitate 
the protection of historic property.35 Still, the Allied forces were cog-
nizant that their aerial bombardment campaigns would devastate 
Germany’s historically-significant cities and towns. As the United 
Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Air at the time noted: 
                                                                                                                       
 30. Carstens, supra note 29, at 11. 
 31. Id. at 12. 
 32. REBECCA KNUTH, BURNING BOOKS AND LEVELING LIBRARIES: EXTREMIST VIO-
LENCE AND CULTURAL DESTRUCTION 164 (2006); REBECCA KNUTH, LIBRICIDE: THE REGIME-
SPONSORED DESTRUCTION OF BOOKS AND LIBRARIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 52 (2003); 
MIECZYSLAW-ARKADIUSZ WOZNIAK, KALISZ—1914: POGROM MIASTA (2001), 
http://www.info.kalisz.pl/kal1914; Carstens, supra note 29, at 12-13. 
 33. O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 35. 
 34. Id. at 79; see also Carstens, supra note 29, at 14 (describing the failures of Nazi 
Germany to protect historic sites and prevent art looting, though the German Kunstschutz 
operation extended to France, Belgium, Serbia, Greece, and Italy). 
 35. See Carstens, supra note 29, at 15-16 (describing the Allied forces’ directives to 
protect cultural property). 
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Monuments of art and antiquity are the common heritage of all 
mankind. We do not deliberately destroy them, but it is our policy 
to restore that greater heritage of mankind—freedom—and to do 
that we must and will destroy the enemy’s means of making war—
his defences, his factories, his stores and his means of transporta-
tion, wherever they may be found.36 
Owing sensitivity to cultural heritage, the Allied forces required ex-
plicit authority from the Supreme Headquarters to bomb certain cul-
turally significant cities in Italy.37 Moreover, the Allied forces spared 
Kyoto and Nara, Japan from the atomic bomb in part because of their 
architectural and artistic heritage.38 
III.   THE POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORY OF THE PROTECTION  
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
 The widespread destruction of cultural property during World 
War I and World War II demonstrated the limited utility of the laws 
of war protecting cultural sites.39 The post-World War II Nuremberg 
Charter did not specifically address the destruction of cultural mon-
uments, but it did address the destruction of private property not out 
of military necessity.40 As a result, the Nuremberg Charter and the 
ensuing trials where Nazi officials were convicted of plunder repre-
sented the first international enforcement of the protection of cultur-
al property.41 Moreover, unlike previous situations, other nations im-
posed responsibility on an individual official of the offending belliger-
ent power for acts against cultural property committed in its name.42 
                                                                                                                       
 36. O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 68 (quoting U.K. Secretary of State for Air, quoted in 
J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 291 (3d ed. 1947)). 
 37. Id. at 69-72. 
 38. Id. at 69. 
 39. Merryman, supra note 15, at 835 (noting that the new military tactic of “total war” 
required new protections for cultural property); see also Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 860 
(noting that World War I proved that states often ignore the laws of war, and that endeav-
ors to adjudicate the perpetrators ex-post-facto failed); He, supra note 14, at 170-71 (noting 
the destruction of the Reims Cathedral and other cultural sites during World War I and 
Hitler’s deliberate destruction of historic sites in World War II were used as a means of 
“breaking down the targeted country’s morale”). 
 40. Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter included among its list of war crimes “plun-
der of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devasta-
tion not justified by military necessity.” Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279. 
 41. Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 860. 
 42. Merryman, supra note 15, at 836. 
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A.   The Genocide Convention 
 In the aftermath of the devastation wrought by World War II, 
governments began the push for a new crime to encompass the totali-
ty of human destruction caused by the Nazis: genocide. The term 
“genocide,” first coined by Rafael Lemkin (a Jewish, Polish expatriate 
scholar) in 1944 to describe the widespread massacring of the Arme-
nians at the hands of the Turks during World War I,43 gained almost 
immediate traction in the aftermath of World War II.44 Lemkin’s def-
inition of genocide was largely holistic,45 but a key component of the 
offense was that it was committed against individuals because of 
their membership in a particular group and, thereby, constituted a 
crime against the group itself.46 Notably, Lemkin originally consid-
ered genocide to encompass the physical, biological, and cultural de-
struction of the group,47 writing that a prohibition on cultural geno-
cide was necessary to protect groups that could not continue to exist 
without the spirit and moral unity provided by their culture.48 The 
proponents of cultural genocide within the United Nations (U.N.) Ad 
Hoc Genocide Committee recognized that “physical destruction of in-
dividuals was not the only possible form of genocide; it was not the 
indispensable condition of that crime.”49 As a result, the drafters of 
the Genocide Convention initially included the cultural genocide pro-
                                                                                                                       
 43. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANAL-
YSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (1944) (“This new word, coined by the 
author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient 
Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing) . . . .”). 
 44. See Perry S. Bechky, Lemkin’s Situation: Toward a Rhetorical Understanding of 
Genocide, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 552 (2012) (“Nuremberg prosecutors mentioned genocide 
in [both] the indictment and trial.”). 
 45. Lemkin defined genocide as the “disintegration of the political and social institu-
tions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of na-
tional groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and 
even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.” LEMKIN, supra note 43, at 79. 
 46. Id. (“Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions 
involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members 
of the national group.”). 
 47. Physical genocide is generally defined as the extermination of the group by killing 
its individual members, while biological genocide includes measures to prevent births with-
in a group, including forced sterilizations and separation of the sexes. U.N. Secretary-
General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 25-26, delivered to U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council, U.N. Doc. E/447 (June 26, 1947) [hereinafter Draft Convention on the Crime of 
Genocide]. Cultural genocide includes attacks beyond the physical and/or biological ele-
ments of a group done in order to eliminate its wider institutions. Examples including the 
prohibition of local languages and schools, the restriction or ban of artistic, literary, and 
cultural activities, and the destruction or confiscation of libraries, museums, artifacts, and 
art. See LEMKIN, supra note 43, at xii, 84. 
 48. See LEMKIN, supra note 43, at 90-95. 
 49. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 
6th Sess., 5th mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.5 (Apr. 16, 1948). 
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hibition.50 However, the question of whether to incorporate the prohi-
bitions on cultural genocide became a contentious issue dividing the 
Genocide Convention.51 Ultimately, the Sixth Committee rejected Ar-
ticle 3, which prohibited cultural genocide, after arguments prevailed 
that physical genocide was a more serious crime than cultural geno-
cide and that the two forms of genocide should not be placed on the 
same level.52 In rejecting “cultural genocide,” the Genocide Conven-
tion limited genocide to “essentially physical acts.”53 
                                                                                                                       
 50. The crime of cultural genocide was defined as: 
Destroying the specific characteristics of the group by: (a) forced transfer of 
children to another human group; or (b) forced and systematic exile of individ-
uals representing the culture of a group; or (c) prohibition of the use of the na-
tional language even in private intercourse; or (d) systematic destruction of 
books printed in the national language or of religious works or prohibition of 
new publications; or (e) systematic destruction of historical or religious monu-
ments or their diversion to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents 
and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in reli-
gious worship.   
Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 47, at 6-7. In addition, a U.N. Ad 
Hoc Genocide Committee produced an initial draft convention (Article III), which proposed 
to prohibit: 
[A]ny deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion 
or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of the national or 
racial origin or religious belief of its members; such as: 1. Prohibiting the use of 
the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and 
circulation of publications in the language of the group; 2. Destroying, or pre-
venting the use of, libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of 
worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. 
U.N. ESCOR, 3rd Year, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 712-13, U.N. Doc. E/3/SR.175-225 (July 
19-Aug. 28, 1948).  
 51. See 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 598, U.N. Sales No. 1949.I.13 (“The Canadian, French, 
United States and United Kingdom representatives opposed the inclusion in the Conven-
tion of provisions relating to “cultural” genocide, holding that this crime was not on a par 
with physical genocide and should be dealt with separately, and that too wide a definition 
of genocide would render the Convention meaningless.”). 
 52. Barry Sautman, “Cultural Genocide” and Tibet, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173, 183 (2003) 
(documenting the debate to include cultural genocide within the bounds of the Genocide 
Convention). 
 53. Thomas W. Simon, Defining Genocide, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 243, 252 (1996); see also 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 216 (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2d ed. 2009) (“[I]n light of the travaux préparatoirers of the Geno-
cide Convention, it seems impossible to consider acts of cultural genocide as punishable 
crimes if they are unrelated to physical or biological genocide.”). Although cultural genocide 
was excluded from the Convention on Genocide, the concept has remained in international 
law contexts. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
used the destruction of cultural heritage in the Balkan conflict as a method to establish 
genocidal intent. David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide Under International Law, 
CARNEGIE COUNCIL FOR ETHICS INT’L AFF. (Apr. 22, 2005), https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/ 
publications/archive/dialogue/2_12/section_1/5139 [https://perma.cc/4WC8-WEHK].  
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B.   The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
 In addition to the Genocide Convention, the premier, post-war in-
ternational humanitarian law conventions were the four instruments 
that comprised the Geneva Conventions of 1949.54 Cultural property 
was not specifically protected in the Geneva Conventions,55 thereby 
establishing a divide between the treatment and protection of cultur-
al heritage and other aspects of international humanitarian law.56 
The protection of cultural property was instead “placed within the 
parameters of the law of armed conflict,57 rather than . . . interna-
tional humanitarian law.”58 
 Still, the Geneva Conventions themselves play an important role 
in the evolution of the law protecting cultural property. First, the 
Geneva Conventions served as the foundation for the subsequent 
1954 Hague Convention protecting cultural property. 59  More im-
portantly, the Geneva Conventions segregate the wartime obligations 
that attach to parties depending upon whether the armed conflict is 
of an international or non-international character. The Geneva Con-
ventions place fewer obligations and restrictions on armed conflicts of 
a non-international character because the international community 
generally considered non-international conflicts to fall within the 
domestic affairs of individual states.60 As a result, the Geneva Con-
                                                                                                                       
 54. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinaf-
ter Geneva Convention No. I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. III]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV]. 
 55. Though the Geneva Conventions do not explicitly protect cultural property, Anne-
Marie Carstens suggests that the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, which includes the 
protection of “personal objects,” contains an implicit protection for some cultural property.  
See Carstens, supra note 29, at 17 n.76 (citing Geneva Convention No. IV, arts. 33, 53). 
 56. Patty Gerstenblith notes that the lack of protection of cultural property in the 
Geneva Conventions may be the result of the characterization of the Geneva Conventions 
being a part of international humanitarian law rather than part of the law of armed con-
flicts. Where the law of armed conflict is a blueprint for restrictions on the methods of con-
ducting armed conflict, international humanitarian law gives greater emphasis to the pro-
tection of human life. Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime 
Against Property or a Crime Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 
344-45 (2016). 
 57. Jiří Toman characterizes the law of armed conflict as “situated halfway between 
military necessity and the principles of humanity and chivalry which both determine the 
formation and application of the law.” TOMAN, supra note 16, at 73. 
 58. Gerstenblith, supra note 56, at 345. 
 59. Carstens, supra note 29, at 17. 
 60. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 66 (3d ed. 2008); 
see also Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva 
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ventions only applied the provisions to non-international conflicts 
that, at the time, were firmly entrenched.61 The segregation of protec-
tions for armed conflicts of an international and non-international 
character was similarly preserved in later conventions and, most sig-
nificantly for purposes of this Article, in the Rome Statute establish-
ing the ICC.62   
C.   The 1954 Hague Convention 
 Entering into force on August 7, 1956, the Hague Convention of 
1954 was the first universal convention to deal solely with the protec-
tion of cultural property.63 For the purposes of the 1954 Hague Con-
vention, the protection of cultural property encompasses both the 
safeguarding of and respect for cultural property.64 The 1954 Hague 
Convention established a specific definition of “cultural property” in 
Article 1, defining it as “movable or immovable property of great im-
portance to the cultural heritage of every people” and buildings that 
contain cultural property. 65  This broad definition has been both 
                                                                                                                  
Conventions and Protocols, in 2 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1979, at 154 (Académie de Droit Int’l ed., 1980) (“Inter-
national law has to take into account that the world is divided into sovereign States, and 
that these States keep to their sovereignty. They are not willing to put insurgents within 
their territory on equal terms with the armed forces of enemy States, or members thereof.”). 
 61. Carstens, supra note 29, at 19 (“To the extent that the international community 
readied itself to accept the extension of obligations to non-international armed conflicts, it 
proved willing to do so only in limited circumstances.”). 
 62. See infra Section V.C. 
 63. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. For a general histo-
ry on the background and creation of the 1954 Hague Convention, see O’KEEFE, supra note 
17, at 93-94. 
 64. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 2; see also Carstens, supra note 29, at 
21 (noting that “safeguarding” property requires positive obligations while “respect” de-
notes negative obligations). 
 65. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 1. Specifically, Article 1 defines “cul-
tural property” as: 
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage 
of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether 
religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a 
whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books 
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as 
scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of re-
productions of the property defined above; 
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the 
movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, 
large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, 
in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in sub-
paragraph (a); 
 
2017]  PROSECUTING MEMBERS OF ISIS 195 
 
praised and criticized by scholars.66 Significantly, the 1954 Hague 
Convention not only defined and protected cultural property, it also 
offered the rationale for such protection:   
 Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to 
any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of 
all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the cul-
ture of the world; 
 Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of 
great importance for all peoples of the world and that it is im-
portant that this heritage should receive international protec-
tion . . . .67 
 The 1954 Hague Convention requires “High Contracting Parties” 
(Contracting Parties) to safeguard cultural property situated in their 
own territory against “foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by tak-
ing such measures as they consider appropriate.”68 Under the 1954 
Hague Convention, each Contracting Party must take affirmative 
steps to protect its own cultural property from foreseeable wartime 
damage.69 Article 3 itself leaves the choice of measures to be adopted 
to the discretion of the Contracting Party in which territory the cul-
tural property is situated.70 Many Contracting Parties have respond-
ed to that affirmative obligation by creating a list of key property to 
                                                                                                                  
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as “centres containing monuments.” 
Id. 
 66. Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?, 1 
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 312-19 (1992) (discussing the origins of “cultural property” 
and the effectiveness and issues surrounding the use of the term); Harvey E. Oyer III, The 
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict – Is it Working? A Case Study: The Persian Gulf War Experience, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 49, 52 (1999) (“ ‘[C]ultural property’ . . . [was] defined . . . broadly enough to en-
compass a very wide range of at-risk property.”); Elizabeth Varner, The Art of Armed Con-
flicts: An Analysis of the United States’ Legal Requirements Towards Cultural Property 
Under the 1954 Hague Convention, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1185, 1193 (2011) (calling the 
definition “vague” after noting that “[t]he legal definition in Article 1 departs from a lay-
person’s use of the term cultural property, which causes confusion in understanding what 
is protected under the 1954 Hague Convention. A layperson’s term for cultural property is 
far broader and more encompassing than Article 1’s definition of cultural property”).  
 67. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, pmbl. 
 68. Id. art. 3. 
 69. Id. Article 3 requires Contracting Parties to “prepare in time of peace for the safe-
guarding of cultural property situated within their own territory against the foreseeable 
effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures as they consider appropriate.” 
 70. Id. 
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be protected, but other nations have examined additional, more crea-
tive means to protect their cultural property.71 
 Contracting Parties must refrain from hostile acts directed 
against cultural property, a prohibition that applies to cultural prop-
erty in their own territory or within the territory of another Contract-
ing Party.72 In addition, the 1954 Hague Convention applies to occu-
pying forces: the Convention imposes an affirmative duty on all Con-
tracting Parties that act as an “Occupying Power” in another country 
to take the necessary measures to preserve the cultural property of 
the occupied country.73 
 The 1954 Hague Convention also incorporates a number of affirm-
ative mechanisms. For example, the 1954 Hague Convention requires 
Contracting Parties to foster in its armed forces “a spirit of respect 
for the culture and cultural property of all peoples,”74 a provision that 
provides for enforcement through education about the importance of 
cultural property.75 Much like earlier documents on the protection of 
cultural property, the 1954 Hague Convention waives the protection of 
cultural property in situations of “military necessity.”76 However, the 
duty to protect cultural property applies before an armed conflict be-
gins, during an armed conflict, and during partial or total occupation.77 
                                                                                                                       
 71. “For example, Bulgaria once studied the possibility of totally or partially disman-
tling some of its monuments in the event of [an] armed conflict.” O’KEEFE, supra note 17, 
at 112. A more common response is for nations to make lists of the locations of prized cul-
tural property. Switzerland sent a map showing the location of cultural property in its 
territory and neighboring Liechtenstein to the Director-General of UNESCO. “Croatian 
authorities sent lists of cultural monuments . . . to the Yugoslav Federal Defence Secretar-
iat and to all headquarters of the Yugoslav National Army” after a July 1991 attack on 
Erdut damaged that city’s medieval fortress. Id. at 114. 
 72. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 4. 
 73. Id. art. 6.  
 74. Id. art. 7.  
 75. Oyer, supra note 66, at 54. 
 76. Merryman, supra note 15, at 837; Oyer, supra note 66, at 55 (“From a practical 
standpoint . . . it is extremely difficult to compel Contracting Parties to comply with the 
provisions of the Hague Convention in times of actual armed conflict.”). 
 77. See 1954 Hague Convention supra note 63, art. 18. Specifically, Article 18 provides: 
 1. Apart from the provisions which shall take effect in time of peace, the 
present Convention shall apply in the event of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one or more of them. 
 2. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation 
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets 
with no armed resistance. 
 3. If one of the Powers in conflict is not a Party to the present Convention, 
the Powers which are Parties thereto shall nevertheless remain bound by it in 
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention, in 
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 The substantive enforcement mechanisms within the 1954 Hague 
Convention are largely designed to be self-enforcing. For example, 
Article 28 incorporated the Principle of International Responsibility, 
a principle affirmed at Nuremberg: “The High Contracting Parties 
undertake to take, within the framework of their ordinary criminal 
jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or dis-
ciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who 
commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Conven-
tion.”78 The language seems to authorize nations that acquire person-
al jurisdiction over individuals charged with 1954 Hague Convention 
violations to try them.79 Enforcement rights under Article 28 are gen-
erally weak, however, allowing each nation to enforce the provision 
as it sees fit. The result is varying penal sanctions and inconsistent 
enforcement results.80  
 The 1954 Hague Convention preserved the distinctions between 
armed conflicts of international and non-international characters 
that were established in the Geneva Conventions. Article 19 lays out 
the requirements for conflicts of a non-international character, noting 
that under those circumstances, “each party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Conven-
tion which relate to respect for cultural property.”81 The “respect” 
provision outlined in Article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention man-
dates that parties refrain from military use of cultural property and 
refrain from acts of hostility directed against cultural property.82 Alt-
hough the other prohibitions and obligations of the 1954 Hague Con-
vention are not mandated in a non-international conflict,83 Article 19 
                                                                                                                  
relation to the said Power, if the latter has declared that it accepts the provi-
sions thereof and so long as it applies them. 
Id. 
 78. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 28 (emphasis added). 
 79. Merryman, supra note 15, at 836. 
 80. Oyer, supra note 66, at 55. Others argue that the failure to enumerate specific 
offenses that give rise to criminal prosecution limits the Convention’s effectiveness. See 
David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural Property in Wartime, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART 
& ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2004). 
 81. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 19(1). 
 82. Id. art. 4. 
 83. Some scholars maintain that the language of Article 4 on “respect for cultural 
property” that requires state parties to “undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, 
put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism 
directed against, cultural property,” id., creates a positive duty to prevent destruction by 
any actor, see, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 214 (2004); O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 133; Patty Ger-
stenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 
7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677, 693 (2009); Wayne Sandholtz, The Iraqi Nation-
al Museum and International Law: A Duty to Protect, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 185, 215 
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notes that parties should “endeavour to bring into force, by means of 
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention.”84 
D.   The 1977 Additional Protocols I and II  
to the Geneva Conventions 
 The inclusion of cultural property protection within the 1977 Pro-
tocols I and II additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions85 heals 
some of the rifts that developed between the scope of protection 
available depending upon whether the conflict was of an internation-
al or non-international character.86 Collectively, the 1977 Protocols 
widened the definition of an international armed conflict while also 
narrowing the qualifications for armed conflicts of a non-
international nature. For example, Protocol I expanded the definition 
of “international armed conflicts” to include conflicts “in which peo-
ples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.”87   
 Most significantly for this Article, the 1977 Protocols work in con-
junction with the provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention to protect 
property.88 For example, Article 53 of Protocol I, which applies in in-
                                                                                                                  
(2005). But see Carstens, supra note 29, at 22 (“The 1954 Hague Convention’s express pro-
visions on positive protection and occupation appear elsewhere in the treaty, and thus are 
not made applicable in non-international armed conflicts.”). 
 84. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 63, art. 19(2). 
 85. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter 1977 Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter 1977 Additional Protocol II] (collec-
tively “1977 Protocols”). 
 86. O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 203 (“Protocol I backs up the rules . . . relevant to the 
protection of cultural property in international armed conflict with penal sanctions.”); Ger-
stenblith, supra note 56, at 345; see also Craig J.S. Forrest, The Doctrine of Military Neces-
sity and the Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
177, 191 (2007) (envisioning the development of the military necessity doctrine moving 
away from a limitation on the conduct of warfare, expressed in the earlier conventions, and 
towards a justification for evading principles in the later conventions, an approach found in 
1977 Additional Protocol I). 
 87. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 85, art. 1(4). 
 88. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, art. 53, at 639 (Yves 
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) (noting that the ICRC did 
not include a provision for the protection of cultural objects since this has been provided for 
by the 1954 Hague Convention); O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 208 (“[T]he motivation behind 
article 53 of [Additional] Protocol I was to affirm in a single provision the essential obliga-
tions of respect in international armed conflict embodied more exhaustively in the 1954 
Hague Convention.”). 
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ternational armed conflicts, and Article 16 of Protocol II, which ap-
plies in non-international armed conflicts, provide protections for 
“historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which consti-
tute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.”89 The 1977 Proto-
cols also prohibit acts of hostility and the use of cultural monuments 
for military purposes.90 In addition, Protocol I creates new obligations 
regarding cultural property during international armed conflicts, 
such as requiring that parties to a conflict provide “precautions in 
attack” and “precautions against the effects of attacks” for civilians 
and civilian objects.91 There is no corollary obligation in Protocol II 
applying to non-international armed conflicts.92 
 Protocol I, applying to international armed conflicts, adds im-
portant concepts that apply to civilian life and civilian objects gener-
ally, with restrictions that are not strictly limited to the protection of 
cultural property. For example, Protocol I includes the principle of 
distinction where the parties to a conflict must distinguish between 
civilian objects and military objects.93 In addition, Protocol I requires 
proportionality when planning attacks to minimize the loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects.94 Significantly, 
both Protocols have been widely accepted: the 1977 Protocols I and II 
have been adopted by 174 and 167 state parties, respectively.95  
E.   The 1999 Second Hague Protocol  
to the 1954 Hague Convention 
 The Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention in 1999 (1999 
Protocol) marked the advancement of individual criminal liability for 
serious violations of international norms on the protection of cultural 
                                                                                                                       
 89. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 85, art. 53; 1977 Additional Protocol II, 
supra note 85, art. 16. 
 90. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 85, art. 53; 1977 Additional Protocol II, 
supra note 85, art. 16. 
 91. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 85, arts. 57, 58. 
 92. Carstens, supra note 29, at 25. 
 93. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 85, art. 48 (principle of distinction). 
 94. Id. art. 57 (principle of proportionality in planning attacks). 
 95. For a list of the state parties to Additional Protocol I, see Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of In-
ternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470 [https://perma.cc/UZ53-4SZU]. For a list of the 
state parties to Additional Protocol II, see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/475?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/QSB4-SP43].  
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heritage.96 Negotiated and adopted to reinforce the weak enforcement 
system of the 1954 Hague Convention in the wake of the destruction 
of cultural property in the late twentieth century, such as the Iran-
Iraq war and the Balkan conflict, the 1999 Protocol applies in its en-
tirety to international and non-international armed conflicts.97   
 The new protocol sought to “bring together all aspects of the law 
protecting cultural property into one document.”98 And to do so, the 
1999 Protocol introduces the principle of universal jurisdiction over 
the most “serious violations” of the norms protecting cultural herit-
age.99 Article 17 obliges the party in whose territory the offender is 
present to prosecute or extradite that person regardless of his or her 
nationality or the place where the offense was committed.100 In addi-
tion, the 1999 Protocol provides that the entire Protocol applies in 
“the event of an armed conflict not of an international character.”101 
 The 1999 Protocol provides widespread obligations for the protec-
tion of cultural monuments and closes the remaining gaps between a 
party’s obligations in international and non-international armed con-
flicts. Regardless of all of the positives of the 1999 Protocol, the docu-
ment has had little effect. Many key parties have not joined it, includ-
ing major military powers such as the United States and, key to this 
Article, Syria and Iraq. Currently, only sixty-eight state parties have 
joined the 1999 Protocol, although two of the signers, Mali and Libya, 
have seen their cultural and historic monuments badly damaged.102  
F.   The Limits of International Conventions  
to Protect Cultural Property 
 Despite the existence of international conventions and protocols, 
prohibitions have largely proved ineffective at enforcing cultural 
                                                                                                                       
 96. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter 
1999 Hague Second Protocol]. 
 97. Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Herit-
age as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1216-17 (2004); see also 
Carstens, supra note 29, at 26-27 (noting the international outcry to the shelling of Du-
brovnik in a non-international armed conflict as an impetus for the 1999 Hague Second 
Protocol). 
 98. UNESCO, Preface to the Inserts on The Second Protocol to The Hague Convention 
of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict—1999, 
UNESCO Doc. CLT/CIH/MCO/2008/PI/H/1, at 3 (Mar. 29, 2003). 
 99. 1999 Hague Second Protocol, supra note 96, art. 15. 
 100. Id. art. 17. 
 101. Id. art. 22(1). 
 102. For a list of the parties to the 1999 Protocol, see Second Protocol to The Hague 
Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
The Hague, 26 March 1999, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO= 
15207&language=E&order=alpha [https://perma.cc/M2QL-KY7Z]. 
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property protection during conflict.103 Gulf War I, however, is one ex-
ample where the United States put into practice the requirements of 
the 1954 Hague Convention. The United States, although not a party 
to the 1954 Hague Convention at the time,104 attempted to avoid the 
destruction of cultural property in the Middle East through the crea-
tion of a “no target list” that named between 2,000 and 3,000 cultural 
sites to be protected.105 Still, as the widespread destruction of cultural 
property from recent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and the former Yugosla-
via demonstrate, the avoidance of the destruction of cultural property 
remains more the exception than the rule. 
IV.   A BRIEF PRIMER ON ISIS 
 ISIS has its roots in the Sunni/Baathist-dominated Iraqi army of 
the Saddam Hussein regime. After the defeat of the Baathist regime, 
members of the Baathist party were banned from serving in the Iraqi 
army and government positions under the United States-backed Ira-
qi government of Shi’ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.106 Following 
their exclusion, former Sunni members of the Iraqi military launched 
a rebellion against the new Iraqi government, naming their group 
“al-Qaeda in Iraq,” and later, the “Islamic State of Iraq.”107 
 At the same time, protests that began in 2011 against the Bashar 
al-Assad regime in neighboring Syria gained strength after Syrian 
                                                                                                                       
 103. See, e.g., Andrera Cunning, The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of 
War & Peace, 11 TULSA  J. COMP. & INT’L L. 211, 232 (2003) (“[T]he 1954 Hague Convention 
reflects the fact that nations are becoming increasingly concerned with the protection of 
cultural property both in armed conflict and peacetime,” acknowledging that “enforcement 
of the 1954 Hague Convention . . . is inconsistent,” and further noting that “[i]n some ways, 
the 1954 Hague Convention has not been any more effective than its predecessor, the 1907 
Hague Convention, in preventing the destruction of cultural property.”); Micaela Frulli, 
The Criminalization of Offences against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The 
Quest for Consistency, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 203, 206 (2011) (“The results . . . were very mod-
est in terms of penal provisions inserted in the Convention, and even more deceiving as far 
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L.J. 349, 357 (1993) (“[M]uch of the pressure for cultural property protection stems from 
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 104. The United States Senate ratified the 1954 Hague Convention on March 13, 2009. 
See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention. The Hague, 14 May 1954., UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637& [https://perma.cc/YLW7-FF6E]. 
 105. Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of 
Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 245, 280 (2006) 
(noting that even with such a list of cultural sites, a number of sites were still damaged). 
 106. See BEN SMITH, ISIS AND THE SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1-9 (Mar. 
19, 2015), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP15-16/RP15-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HJ9K-CNVV]. 
 107. See id. at 7. 
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government authorities attempted to suppress the protests. 108  By 
2014, Syria had blossomed into a full-fledged civil war.109 The insta-
bility in Syria allowed the Iraqi group to cross the border, claim Syri-
an territory, and establish its “capital” in the Syrian city of al-
Raqqah.110 With its foothold in two countries, the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria changed its name to ISIS.111 Soon thereafter, ISIS 
seized Syrian oil wells and refineries, thereby providing the insur-
gent group with additional financial resources.112 ISIS’s capture of 
the city of Mosul in Iraq provided an additional windfall, giving the 
group access to financial capital in addition to a stash of tanks and 
weapons that ISIS seized from the departing Iraqi army.113 
 Over time, the aims of ISIS have come to differ from the al-Qaeda 
terrorist network with which the group initially affiliated. The al-
Qaeda group has predominately sought to attack Western interests 
through the use of terror.114 ISIS similarly advocates and employs the 
use of terror throughout the world, most notably in the bombing of a 
Russian jetliner over Egypt on October 31, 2015, and the Paris at-
tacks on November 13, 2015. But, unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS has also 
seized and controlled territory in Iraq and Syria with the proclaimed 
purpose of creating an Islamic caliphate in the region.115 To achieve 
such goals, in addition to destroying archaeological sites, historic 
monuments, and religious structures that run contra to ISIS’s reli-
gious beliefs, the regime has killed thousands of Shi’ites, Christians, 
and Kurds. Additionally, much like Afghanistan’s former Taliban re-
gime, it has implemented repressive edicts and conditions on the 
population of its captured territory.116 Moreover, because of ISIS’s 
divergent aims and an ongoing conflict with al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s 
Syrian entity, al-Qaeda disavowed ISIS’s operations in Syria in 
2014.117 Although experts suggest that the majority of the top ISIS 
decisionmakers are former members of Saddam Hussein’s army and 
                                                                                                                       
 108. Michael Slackman, Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html. 
 109. See SMITH, supra note 106, at 8.  
 110. See id. at 1. 
 111. See id. at 8.  
 112. See id. at 17. 
 113. See id. at 16-17. 
 114. Michael P. Scharf, How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law, 48 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 15, 21 (2016). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Al-Qaeda Disavows ISIS Militants in Syria, BBC (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/ 
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security forces, 118  ISIS’s ranks have also been bolstered by up to 
27,000 foreign fighters who have traveled to the region from other 
parts of the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America after 
being drawn to ISIS’s extremist ideology.119 
V.   THE PROSECUTION OF ISIS MEMBERS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF 
CULTURAL HERITAGE 
 In late December 2016, the U.N. General Assembly established an 
independent panel to assist in the investigation and prosecution of 
those most responsible for war crimes in Syria.120 Formally known 
since March 2011 as the “International, Impartial and Independent 
Mechanism to assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of those 
Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law 
committed in [Syria]” (Mechanism), the panel will be led by a senior 
judge or prosecutor with extensive international criminal investiga-
tion and prosecution experience. 121  The Mechanism will have two 
primary functions. First, the Mechanism is meant to collect, consoli-
date, preserve, and analyze evidence pertaining to violations and 
abuses of human rights and humanitarian law.122 Second, it will also 
prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent 
criminal proceedings.123 
 Three plausible avenues exist for the prosecution124 of ISIS mem-
bers: (1) in the domestic courts of Syria, Iraq, or the home jurisdic-
                                                                                                                       
 118. SMITH, supra note 106, at 9; CHARLES LISTER, ISLAMIC STATE SENIOR LEADERSHIP: 
WHO’S WHO (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/en_whos_who.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LCC7-677S]; Sarah Childress et al., Who Runs the Islamic State?, PBS  
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/who-runs-the-islamic-state/ 
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TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-
and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/ [https://perma.cc/UM5J-ECJ6]. 
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ble War Crimes, UN NEWS (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID 
=55862 [https://perma.cc/TX5R-PDCS]. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Prosecution is not the only option when dealing with ISIS’s destruction of cultural 
monuments in violation of international law. For example, another potential response 
could be financial, rather than criminal, penalties. Moreover, as history has often shown, a 
common collective response to violations of international law has been inaction. Still, there 
was widespread outrage about ISIS’s many crimes, including its destruction of cultural 
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tions of third-party nationals, (2) before an ad hoc criminal tribunal 
established by the U.N. Security Council, or (3) before the ICC. Each 
offers potential complications to achieving justice.   
A.   Domestic Prosecution in  
Syria, Iraq, or Home Jurisdictions 
 Because the destruction of a nation’s cultural monuments is in-
herently jurisdiction-specific, one option is to prosecute in the domes-
tic courts of Syria or Iraq, with each domestic system handling the 
prosecution of the monuments destroyed within its own country. Alt-
hough such prosecution might be facially attractive, a number of 
complications suggest that domestic prosecution is unworkable. For 
example, both Syria and Iraq have proven incapable of arresting ISIS 
members. Given the general instabilities of both counties, significant 
misgivings exist regarding the capabilities of the Iraqi and Syrian 
justice systems. Moreover, countries immersed in or emerging from 
conflict rarely have the immediate domestic capacity or resources to 
embark upon complicated factual investigations or to initiate the 
complex judicial proceedings required for such wide-reaching 
crimes.125 To remedy these issues, the international community could 
provide resource transfers or personnel support to the Syrian and 
Iraqi courts, thereby allowing prosecutions to proceed within home 
jurisdictions.126 Still, the post-conflict judiciaries of both nations are 
largely untested.    
 A second option is that each country handles the prosecution of its 
nationals within its own domestic jurisdiction. In investigations that 
encompassed all war crimes committed in Syria by various actors, 
national authorities have begun criminal investigations of residents 
for their roles in crimes committed in the Middle East, including in-
                                                                                                                  
monuments. That outrage, coupled with the recent ICC case where monument destruction 
was charged as a stand-alone war crime, and the creation of the Syria Mechanism to gath-
er and preserve evidence for use in criminal proceedings suggests that the international 
response to ISIS’s crimes, including the destruction of cultural property, will be prosecu-
tion. 
 125. See, e.g., Cody Corliss, Truth Commissions and the Limits of Restorative Justice: 
Lessons Learned in South Africa’s Cradock Four Case, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 273, 282-
83 (2013) (describing the limits of South Africa’s criminal justice system after the end of 
apartheid). 
 126. For example, the international community is supporting the creation of a Kosovo 
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vestigations or prosecutions in France,127 Sweden,128 Norway,129 the 
Netherlands,130 and Germany.131 While these measures will achieve 
some measure of justice, the punishment will differ depending upon 
the jurisdiction where the national resides. In addition, not all states 
exercise jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international 
armed conflicts such as the one in Syria.132 Moreover, nationals re-
sponsible for crimes could avoid punishment by remaining residents 
in nations that have less incentive to prosecute crimes committed in 
Syria or Iraq. 
B.   An Ad Hoc International Tribunal 
 The second method of prosecution is through an ad hoc interna-
tional tribunal established by the U.N. Security Council or by an in-
ternational agreement. For example, Carla del Ponte, a member of 
the U.N. Commission of Inquiry in Syria at the time and the former 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY), suggested that an ad hoc criminal tribunal located in 
the region would offer the best means for widespread prosecution to 
punish the numerous offenders in the Syrian conflict.133 The United 
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[https://perma.cc/WM2L-K5QG]. 
 132. As Beth Van Schaack notes, international treaties do not mandate jurisdiction 
over non-international armed conflicts, thereby relying on the laws of each state’s handling 
of jurisdiction for non-international armed conflicts. Beth Van Schaack, Mapping War 
Crimes in Syria, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 281, 330 (2016). The United States, for example, can 
assert jurisdiction where the perpetrator or victim is a U.S. national or member of the 
American armed forces. See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012). 
 133. Julian Borger, Call for Special Tribunal to Investigate War Crimes and Mass 
Atrocities in Syria, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ 
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States House of Representatives has similarly backed an ad hoc tri-
bunal. 134  Additionally, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has noted 
that she would support an ad hoc tribunal if the path to justice is 
blocked in the ICC.135  
 An ad hoc tribunal would be able to charge property-related 
crimes, such as the destruction of cultural and historic sites, as the 
ICTY has done.136 Moreover, the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal 
in the Middle East would allow investigations and prosecutions to 
occur closer to the site of the conflict. A closer proximity would allow 
Iraqi and Syrian judges, jurists, and investigators to more easily par-
ticipate in the work of the tribunal, thereby bringing local ownership 
and greater legitimacy to the tribunal while also helping build do-
mestic legal capacity.137 An ad hoc tribunal would have drawbacks, 
however; most notably, in its expense and, in some instances, in the 
speed of prosecutions.138 In addition, the establishment of an ad hoc 
tribunal would delegitimize the ICC, since the ICC was partly estab-
lished to avoid the creation of ad hoc international tribunals.139  
 Past international criminal tribunals have taken varying views 
regarding the criminalization of the destruction of cultural and his-
toric property. Tribunals such as those for the former Yugoslavia and 
Cambodia have included property-related crimes within their crimi-
nal statutes while others, such as Rwanda, have not. By criminaliz-
ing the destruction of historic monuments, the ICTY took a major 
step toward a direct, explicit codification of cultural property 
crimes.140 For example, Article 3(d) of the ICTY statute specifically 
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 140. Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The 
Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 27, 30 (2001) (“The insertion in the ICTY Statute of crimes pertaining to cultural 
property, whether directly or indirectly, was a major step toward strengthening previous 
international instruments’ protection of cultural property in times of armed conflict. The 
 
2017]  PROSECUTING MEMBERS OF ISIS 207 
 
refers to the destruction of cultural property by criminalizing the 
“seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedi-
cated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, histor-
ic monuments and works of art and science.”141 Similarly, criminal 
culpability for the destruction of cultural property is indirectly pro-
vided under Article 3(c), which criminalizes attacks on enemy proper-
ty, and Articles 2(d), 3(b), and 3(e), which criminalize the destruction 
and plunder of enemy property.142 Within the ICTY, two alternative 
approaches have developed for the prosecution of the destruction of 
cultural property. Such destruction has been charged as either a war 
crime or a crime against humanity—both approaches leading to suc-
cessful prosecutions but with distinction in terms of evidence and le-
gal argument.143   
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) 
has also incorporated property-related crimes into its statute.144 For 
example, Article 7 of the Cambodian law, which established the 
ECCC for the prosecution of crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge 
regime, provides the ECCC with “the power to bring to trial all Sus-
pects most responsible for the destruction of cultural property during 
armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and which were 
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 
1979.”145 
 Although the ECCC and the ICTY explicitly listed the destruction 
of cultural property as chargeable crimes under their respective stat-
utes, such treatment is not universal. For example, the Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone tribunals do not explicitly list the destruction of cultur-
al property as chargeable offenses. Although the Rwanda tribunal is 
not limited by a set list of enumerated violations, Article 4 of the 
statute establishing the Rwanda tribunal mentions only pillage as a 
war crime related to property.146 The statute establishing the Special 
                                                                                                                  
inclusion in ICTY indictments of criminal charges addressing damages to cultural property 
concretized this step.”).  
 141. S.C. Res. 827, art. 3(d) (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 142. Id. arts. 2(d), 3(b), 3(c), 3(e). 
 143. Brammertz, supra note 136, at 1151-57, 1160-61. 
 144. See EHLERT, supra note 11, at 198-200.  
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7, NS/RKM/0801/12 (Oct. 27, 2004). For a general description of prosecution of cultural 
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Court for Sierra Leone takes a similar approach, prohibiting pillage 
and the general destruction of property.147 
 Scholars have explained the differing treatment of criminality for 
property crimes as reflecting the varying degrees of damage to cul-
tural and historic property that occurred as a result of each con-
flict.148 For example, the widespread scale of cultural destruction in 
the former Yugoslavia was the impetus for an explicit recognition of 
crimes for cultural destruction at the ICTY.149 Certainly, damage to 
cultural sites in Mostar, Dubrovnik, and Sarajevo in the former Yu-
goslavia were well documented in the media at the time.150 Prosecu-
tors at the ICTY indicted leaders responsible for the destruction of 
cultural property as part of a litany of available charges. Moreover, 
convictions were entered against military leaders responsible for the 
destruction of such property,151 including the Serb general who or-
dered the bombing of the Old Town in Dubrovnik152 and the Croatian 
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general responsible for the destruction of the historic Old Bridge 
(Stari Most) at Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina.153 As ICTY Prosecutor 
Serge Brammertz noted, “Through the ICTY’s cases, the law crimi-
nalizing attacks against cultural property has been progressively de-
veloped and refined. It is now clear that customary international law 
recognizes attacks against cultural property as criminal.”154 Moreover, 
criminal accountability for such cultural crimes can extend to those 
who were far removed from the scene and who did not directly partic-
ipate in the destruction.155 
C.   The International Criminal Court 
 The ICC, established by the Rome Statute of the ICC, created a 
permanent court to prosecute the most serious violations of interna-
tional law.156 The Rome Statute extends the court’s subject matter to 
only four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,157 
and aggression.158 Although trying acts of terrorism does not specifi-
cally fall within the ICC’s mandate, such acts may fall within the def-
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roots of a prohibition of “aggression” come from the Nuremberg judgment which declared 
aggression to be “the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in 
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” Judicial Decisions: Inter-
national Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 
186 (1947). The prohibition against aggression was similarly embodied in the United Na-
tions Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. For a detailed examination of the creation and 
implementation of the crime of aggression within the ICC, see Leila Sadat & Richard S. 
Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 
436-44 (2000). 
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inition of the crimes already under the court’s jurisdiction,159 such as 
war crimes “when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes.”160 
 1.   Armed Conflict of an International or Non-International  
      Character 
 The Rome Statute distinguishes between armed conflicts of an in-
ternational and non-international character,161 a distinction with roots 
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 Protocols.162  Two 
conditions precedent exist in order for the existence of an armed in-
ternational conflict: the parties to the conflict must be states and the 
conflict must be “armed.”163 Though “armed conflict” was first intro-
duced in the Geneva Conventions, the term was not defined in the Con-
vention and its subsequent 1977 Protocols. The Appeals Chamber of 
the ICTY later defined the term “armed conflict” in its Tadić decision: 
On the basis of the foregoing, we find that an armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or pro-
tracted armed violence between governmental authorities and or-
ganized armed groups or between such groups within a State. In-
ternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such 
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities un-
til a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of inter-
nal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, 
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole 
territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, 
the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not ac-
tual combat takes place there.164 
                                                                                                                       
 159. Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International 
Criminal Court as a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 15 (2003). 
 160. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(1). 
 161. Compare id. art. 8(2)(b), with id. art. 8(2)(e). 
 162. See supra Sections III.B-D. 
 163. Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 54, art. 2 provides that the Conventions 
“apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them.” The 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions adopts the same 
formulation by reference. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 85, art. 1(3). “[T]he 
State-on-State construct for international armed conflict is universally seen as reflecting 
customary international law.” Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-
International Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 4 (2014). The United States Supreme 
Court similarly adopted this approach to distinguish conflicts between nations and those 
“not of an international character.” Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006). 
 164. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).  
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The Tadić decision on “armed conflict” has become the most frequent-
ly cited definition of the term.165 
 Since the end of World War II, there have been few strictly “inter-
national armed conflicts” as defined by the jurisprudence around the 
term first used in the Geneva Conventions.166 In recent years, howev-
er, many conflicts no longer fit neatly within the “internation-
al/internal” rubric.167 Specifically, terror networks provide an even 
greater challenge to the international or non-international armed 
conflict dichotomy.168 ISIS, for example, is not a party to internation-
al conventions, much less even a recognized state, as much as it 
seeks to legitimize itself as one.169  
 Scholars are in general agreement that the situation in Syria is an 
armed conflict of a non-international character.170 Certainly, under 
the standard definitions springing from the Geneva Conventions, the 
                                                                                                                       
 165. Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2475 (2008). 
 166. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the 
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 713 (2004); Carstens, 
supra note 29, at 4-5 (noting that the conflicts of a non-international nature account for the 
vast majority of armed conflicts). 
 167. Brooks, supra note 166, at 714. For example, Brooks notes, as examples, armed 
conflicts where insurgent groups train and attack from across international borders where 
a neighboring state is too weak to prevent its territory from being used as a base or con-
flicts in which one or more “outside” state provides material support to insurgents fighting 
within another state. Id. Moreover, Hans-Peter Gasser defines an “internationalized non-
international armed conflict” as “a civil war characterized by the intervention of the armed 
forces of a foreign power.” Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed 
Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 145 
(1983); see also Amal Alamuddin & Philippa Webb, Expanding Jurisdiction Over War 
Crimes Under Article 8 of the ICC Statute, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1219, 1221 (2010) (noting 
recent signs that customary international law is moving toward a common approach to 
different types of armed conflicts, particularly because “[c]ontemporary conflicts are often a 
mixture of international and non-international elements, with internal hostilities being 
rendered international through state intervention, and international conflicts being con-
ducted covertly as internal conflicts”). 
 168. For an examination of “armed conflict” as it applies to al-Qaeda, see Balendra, 
supra note 165, at 2461. 
 169. See Scharf, supra note 114, at 66 (“ISIS [is] . . . a non-state actor [that] possesses 
many of the attributes of a State[, including] massive wealth, sophisticated training and 
organization, and access to destructive weaponry.”); Adam Withnall, Iraq Crisis: Isis De-
clares its Territories a New Islamic State With ‘Restoration of Caliphate’ in Middle East, 
INDEPENDENT (June 30, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-
declares-new-islamic-state-in-middle-east-with-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-as-emir-removing-
iraq-and-9571374.html [https://perma.cc/YN9B-WYUZ]. 
 170. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 18 (2015) (noting that the situation in Syria since 2011 is a non-international 
armed conflict); Carstens, supra note 29, at 4 (“The conflicts in Syria and Iraq between 
government forces and organized rebel groups (including Islamic State militants) qualify as 
non-international armed conflicts under international law.”); Daniel E. Stigall & Christo-
pher L. Blakesley, Non-State Armed Groups and the Role of Transnational Criminal Law 
During Armed Conflicts, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 30 (2015) (classifying the conflict 
in Syria as a non-international armed conflict).. 
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conflict between states and ISIS does not qualify as an “international 
armed conflict.”171 Still, to classify Syria’s fight with ISIS, for example, 
as purely “internal” fails to account for the global nature of ISIS’s 
presence beyond the Syrian border.  
 2.   Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
 Article 8 gives the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes “com-
mitted as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commis-
sion of such crimes.”172 The Article incorporates the grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions, breaches which encompass both acts 
against persons and property.173 In addition, Article 8 divides serious 
violations of the laws and customs of war along the lines of interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts.174 Article 8 lists greater 
prohibitions of crimes related to the destruction of property that oc-
cur in an international armed conflict. Such prohibitions include “di-
recting attacks against civilian objects,”175 “[a]ttacking or bombard-
ing . . . buildings which are undefended and which are not military 
objectives,”176 and “[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings 
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, 
                                                                                                                       
 171. See Geneva Convention No. III, supra note 54, at 136 (declaring that the Conventions 
apply to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict” between signatory states). 
 172. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(1). 
 173. The ICC Statute specifically defines the following grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions as “war crimes”: 
(a)   Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any 
of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions 
of the relevant Geneva Convention:  
(i)  Wilful killing; 
(ii)   Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
(iii)  Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; 
(iv)  Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
(v)   Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the 
forces of a hostile Power;  
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial; 
(vii)  Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; 
(viii)  Taking of hostages. 
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(a). 
 174. See, e.g., id. art. 8(2)(b)-(c). 
 175. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii). 
 176. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
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historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wound-
ed are collected, provided they are not military objectives.”177 
 Reflective of a trend that has emerged in international law, the 
Rome Statute provides fewer prohibitions to actions that occur in the 
course of non-international armed conflicts. Though there are only 
twelve named prohibitions to actions in an non-international armed 
conflict, one of those addresses the intentional targeting of cultural 
property; namely, Article 8(2)(e)(iv) which—like its international 
armed conflict counterpart—prohibits “[i]ntentionally directing at-
tacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science 
or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places 
where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not mili-
tary objectives.”178 
 The replication of the prohibition against attacks against historic 
property in Articles 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv) means that unlawfully 
directing such attacks constitutes a war crime regardless of the char-
acter of the armed conflict. As worded, the sections suggest that any 
damage resulting to the structures in question is immaterial to the 
crime, since liability accrues for the “intentionally directing” of an at-
tack with no mention of the outcome of such a direction.179 In terms of 
mens rea of the offense, the attack in question must be committed with 
intent and knowledge,180 meaning the “awareness that a circumstance 
exists.”181 As such, the accused must have directed an attack with the 
knowledge that the objects in question were cultural property.182 
 3.   Article 8(2)(e)(iv) in Practice: The Trial of Ahmad Al Faqi  
      Al Mahdi in the ICC 
 The recent conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the destruc-
tion of cultural and religious sites in Mali represents the first in-
stance of an international prosecution for war crimes for cultural her-
itage destruction where the alleged perpetrator was not charged with 
other war crimes or crimes against humanity.183 Al Mahdi was a 
                                                                                                                       
 177. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ix). 
 178. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(iv). 
 179. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ix), (e)(iv). 
 180. Id. art. 30(1) (“Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the mate-
rial elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”). 
 181. Id. art. 30(3) (“ ‘[K]nowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”). 
 182. O’KEEFE, supra note 17, at 345. 
 183. Bill Chappell, Demolition of Timbuktu’s Cultural Sites Spurs War-Crimes Trial at 
The Hague, NPR (Mar. 1, 2016, 8:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/ 
01/468683861/demolition-of-timbuktus-cultural-sites-spurs-war-crimes-trial-at-the-hague; 
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leader of Ansar Eddine, a Tuareg group that controlled areas of Ma-
li’s northern desert together with al-Qaeda in the Arab Maghreb, in 
September 1995.184 As the head of Hisbah, the body established to 
uphold public morals and prevent vice,185 Al Mahdi directed his sup-
porters to destroy ten of the most important and well-known cultural 
sites in Timbuktu.186 The attacks served no military objective.187     
 The ICC classified the conflict in Mali as a non-international 
armed conflict. 188  As such, Al Mahdi was charged under Article 
8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute.189 Criminal responsibility fell under 
Article 25(3)(a) (as a direct co-perpetrator), Article 25(3)(b) (for solic-
iting and inducing the commission of the crime), Article 25(3)(c) (for 
facilitating the commission of such a crime by aiding, abetting, or 
otherwise assisting), and Article 25(3)(d) (for contributing in any oth-
er way to the commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose).190 The trial chamber confirmed the charges 
on March 24, 2016.191   
 Al Mahdi avoided a protracted trial through a guilty plea.192 In a 
forceful opening statement at the shortened trial, ICC Prosecutor 
                                                                                                                  
see also Gerstenblith, supra note 56, at 386-87 (describing the early stages of the proceed-
ings against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi). 
 184. For a general description of the history of the case against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 
see COMMC’NS SERV. OF THE INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, CASE INFOR-
MATION SHEET: THE PROSECUTOR V. AHMAD AL FAQI AL MAHDI (2017) [hereinafter AL MAHDI 
CASE INFORMATION SHEET], https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/al-mahdiEng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9BV-ALH9]. The government of Mali referred the situation to the ICC on 
July 13, 2012. See Referral Letter from Garde des Sceaux, Le Ministre de la Justice, The 
Republic of Mali, to the ICC (July 13, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A245A47F-
BFD1-45B6-891C-3BCB5B173F57/0/ReferralLetterMali130712.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3PW-
2LW3]. After conducting a preliminary examination of the situation, the Office of the Prose-
cutor opened an investigation on January 16, 2013, into alleged crimes committed in the ter-
ritory of Mali since January 2012. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor 
Opens Investigation Into War Crimes in Mali: “The legal requirements have been met. We 
will investigate” (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr869&ln=en 
[https://perma.cc/YRY7-9N23]. 
 185. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Charge 
Brought by the Prosecution Against Ahmad AL Faqi Al Mahdi, ¶¶ 6-7 (Dec. 17, 2015).  
 186. Id.  ¶¶ 12-16. 
 187. Id.  ¶¶ 4, 11, 16.  
 188. Id. ¶ 4. 
 189. Id. ¶ 23. 
 190. Id.; see also Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 25(3)(a)-(d). 
 191. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges Against Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, ¶ 58 (Mar. 24, 2016). 
 192. AL MAHDI CASE INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 184, ¶ 2.   
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Fatou Bensouda acknowledged the significance of the charges for the 
destruction of religious and cultural sites.193 She stated:  
Today’s trial is indeed historic.  
And it is all the more historic in view of the destructive rage that 
marks our times, in which humanity’s common heritage is subject 
to repeated and planned ravages by individuals and groups whose 
goal is to eradicate any representation of a world that differs from 
theirs by eliminating the physical manifestations that are at the 
heart of communities. The differences and values of these commu-
nities are thus simply denied and annihilated. 
 . . . . 
This is the essence, the very heart of this case. What makes this 
crime so serious is the fact that it is a profound attack on the iden-
tity, the memory and, therefore, the future of entire populations. 
This is a crime against that which constitutes the richness of 
whole communities. And it is thus a crime that impoverishes us all 
and damages universal values we are bound to protect.194 
As Bensouda explained, such types of crimes present the interna-
tional community with considerable challenges. First, “deliberate at-
tacks on cultural property are often the precursor to the worst out-
rages against a population.”195 Second, deliberate attacks on cultural 
property have become weapons of war 
[U]sed to eliminate entire communities and wipe out any traces 
left of them, their history and identity, as though they never exist-
ed. . . . To be sure, attacks on historic monuments and buildings 
dedicated to religion are de facto attacks on the very people that 
hold such tangible possessions near and dear to their cultural 
identity.196 
 Most significantly, Bensouda suggested that the protection of cul-
tural heritage is an essential part of the post-conflict social recon-
                                                                                                                       
 193. Statement of Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-al-mahdi-160822 
[https://perma.cc/45LK-XRAN].  
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. Specifically, Bensouda gave an example of how the destruction of cultural and 
religious monuments allows for a revision of history. In a case before the ICTY, the trier of 
fact established that Serbs destroyed five mosques in the Bosnian city of Zvornik. Id. Ben-
souda contrasted these facts with the statements of the Serb-installed mayor of Zvornik 
who asserted in 1993 that “[t]here were never . . . any mosques in Zvornik.” Id.; Carol J. 
Williams, Serbs Stay Their Ground on Muslim Land: Bosnia: Conquering Warlords Bend 
History and Reality in an Attempt to Justify Their Spoils, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1993), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-03-28/news/mn-16253_1_bosnian-serb 
[https://perma.cc/Y48R-47G5]. 
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struction and reconciliation process where cultural heritage serves as 
a common reference point and provides a sense of community conti-
nuity.197 She continued: 
My message today is this: our cultural heritage is not a luxury 
good. Our cultural heritage is a vital instrument of human devel-
opment. 
To protect cultural property is to protect our culture, our history, 
our identity, and our ways of expressing faith and practicing reli-
gion for current and future generations. We must protect our 
common heritage from desecration, ravages and the long-term ef-
fects of such destructive acts.198 
Interestingly, Bensouda emphasized the cultural virtue rather than 
the religious aspects of the historic structures.199  
 The defendant’s guilty plea may have avoided a full-fledged crimi-
nal trial on the charges, but the successful prosecution for the de-
struction of religious or cultural sites elevates the status of the crime 
of cultural heritage destruction, nonetheless. Al Mahdi was sen-
tenced to a prison term of nine years, a sentence on the low end of the 
range suggested by the prosecution.200 Moreover, the conviction of Al 
Mahdi sets a precedent for the prosecution of members of ISIS for 
their roles in the destruction of historic and religious sites through-
out the Middle East, including the Temple of Baalshamin and the 
Temple of Bel in Syria. 
 4.   Jurisdiction 
 The ICC is designed to be a court of last resort.201 The Rome Stat-
ute provides for jurisdiction ratione personae over natural persons 
who are over the age of eighteen,202 thereby excluding jurisdiction 
against organizations such as states or ISIS in general.203 Three ave-
nues exist for the ICC to prosecute a matter:  (1) referral by a state 
party,204 (2) an investigation initiated by the ICC prosecutor,205 or (3) 
                                                                                                                       
 197. See Statement of Fatou Bensouda, supra note 193. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id.; see also Gerstenblith, supra note 56, at 387 (analyzing the Prosecutor’s 
statements when the Trial Chamber confirmed criminal charges against Al Mahdi). 
 200. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 
106 (Sept. 27, 2016). The Prosecution sought a sentence of between nine and eleven years. 
Id. 
 201. Brammertz, supra note 136, at 1172. 
 202. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 26. 
 203. Id. arts. 1, 25(1). In addition, the Rome Statute does not permit trials in absentia. 
Id. art. 63(1). 
 204. Id. arts. 13(a), 14. 
 205. Id. arts. 13(c), 15. 
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U.N. Security Council referral.206 The geographic scope of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, rationale loci, varies depending on the mechanism by 
which the case comes to the court.207 In the event that the U.N. Secu-
rity Council refers the matter, jurisdiction covers the territory of eve-
ry state in the world, whether or not the state in question is a party 
to the Rome Statute.208 If the matter is referred by a state party or 
initiated proprio motu by the prosecutor, the court’s jurisdiction is 
more restricted. Under those circumstances, jurisdiction extends to 
the territory of a nonparty state only if that state consents to the ju-
risdiction of the court, and either the acts were committed in the ter-
ritory of the consenting state or the accused is a national of the con-
senting state.209 
 a.   Referral: State Parties and the ICC 
 Because the Rome Statute does not envisage the ICC as the pri-
mary tribunal for perpetrators of certain crimes under international 
criminal law,210 the responsibility for investigating and prosecuting 
perpetrators of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction remains first 
with domestic courts.211 Under the principle of complementarity, ju-
risdiction is only granted to the ICC when a country with primary 
competency is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the 
crime at issue.212 The principle of complementarity has a number of 
benefits. First, it allays fears that the ICC will encroach upon the 
sovereignty of nations; and second, the existence of potential jurisdic-
                                                                                                                       
 206. Id. art. 13(b). Although the ICC is designed to be independent of the United Na-
tions, the ICC retains ties to the United Nations through the Security Council’s referral 
power. See Sadat & Carden, supra note 158, at 400. 
 207. Sadat & Carden, supra note 158, at 404. 
 208. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 13(b). Because the Security Council will refer 
cases only under its Chapter VII powers, referral to the ICC, like the establishment of ad-
hoc tribunals, is presumably a measure “not involving the use of force” that the Security 
Council may adopt to maintain international peace and security. See Sadat & Carden, su-
pra note 158, at 404; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Mo-
tion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 34-36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yu-
goslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 209. Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 4(2), 12(2). 
 210. Brammertz, supra note 136, at 1172 (noting that the ICC is the court of last re-
sort); Goldstone, supra note 159, at 21; Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns Be Brought to 
Justice? The Crime of Genocide’s Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 257, 322 (2002) (noting that the ICC’s jurisdiction is specifically comple-
mentary); Sadat & Carden, supra note 158, at 396  (noting that the ICC does not operate 
on the basis of primary jurisdiction). 
 211. Goldstone, supra note 159, at 21. 
 212. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 17. 
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tion acts as an incentive for sovereign nations to investigate and pun-
ish the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction.213 
 Currently, jurisdiction presents a stumbling block to the interna-
tional prosecution of ISIS. Syria and Iraq are not parties to the Rome 
Statute, and therefore, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over the 
crimes committed in those countries unless the U.N. Security Council 
has referred the situation to the court.214 Still, a nonparty may avail 
itself to ICC jurisdiction, as Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Palestine 
have previously done.215 Under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, a 
nonparty state may declare that it accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
“with respect to the crime in question” without ratifying or acceding 
to the full Rome Statute.216 Although the use of Article 12(3) is some-
what controversial,217 there have been repeated calls for Syria and 
Iraq to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC.218 Such calls have so far 
                                                                                                                       
 213. Goldstone, supra note 159, at 21. 
 214. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 13(b). 
 215. William Schabas, The International Criminal Court and Non-Party States, 28 
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 1, 8 (2010).  
 216. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 12(3). 
 217. Article 12 has been criticized in the past as allowing a means for a nation to shield 
itself from ICC jurisdiction, but then to use ICC jurisdiction offensively. For example, the 
United States argued that Article 12(3) would allow Saddam Hussein to selectively invoke 
ICC jurisdiction against the United States for alleged crimes committed by the United 
States in Iraq while at the same time shielding his regime from jurisdiction for the alleged 
atrocities committed by the Hussein regime against Iraqis. See David J. Scheffer, A Nego-
tiator’s Perspective on the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001); Scha-
bas, supra note 215, at 9. In response to such concerns, a provision of the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence established: 
Rule 44. Declaration provided for in article 12, paragraph 3 
 1. The Registrar, at the request of the Prosecutor, may inquire of a State 
that is not a Party to the Statute or that has become a Party to the Statute af-
ter its entry into force, on a confidential basis, whether it intends to make the 
declaration provided for in article 12, paragraph 3. 
 2. When a State lodges, or declares to the Registrar its intent to lodge, a 
declaration with the Registrar pursuant to article 12, paragraph 3, or when the 
Registrar acts pursuant to sub-rule 1, the Registrar shall inform the State con-
cerned that the declaration under article 12, paragraph 3,  has as a conse-
quence the acceptance of jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in 
article 5 of relevance to the situation and the provisions of Part 9, and any 
rules thereunder concerning State Parties, shall apply. 
Report of the Prepatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/A/Add.1, at 17 (2000). The Rule’s intent is to make one-sided manipulation 
of jurisdiction impossible. Schabas, supra note 215, at 10 (2010). 
 218. For example, a February 2, 2016 Resolution of the European Parliament regard-
ing the systematic mass murders of religious minorities urged Iraq and Syria to “accept the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.” Resolution on the Systematic Mass Mur-
der of Religious Minorities By the So-Called ‘ISIS/Daesh’, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2016/2529 (2016). 
2017]  PROSECUTING MEMBERS OF ISIS 219 
 
gone unanswered. Neither Syria nor Iraq has indicated that it will 
accept ICC jurisdiction. 
 b.   An Investigation Initiated by the ICC Prosecutor 
 The ICC Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on 
the basis of information regarding crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the court.219 Again, however, the ICC Prosecutor is hamstrung by ju-
risdiction. Since neither Syria nor Iraq is a party to the Rome Statute, 
the ICC Prosecutor lacks territorial jurisdiction to open an investiga-
tion under Article 12.220 The ICC Prosecutor could still open an inves-
tigation against ISIS members who are nationals of state parties un-
der Article 12(2)(b).221 Because the majority of ISIS’s leadership hails 
from Iraq and Syria,222 the prosecution  would have the unintended 
consequence of only reaching a limited number of responsible mem-
bers, a particularly troublesome result given the Rome Statute’s goal 
of placing “State and non-State actors side-by-side in the interna-
tional arena.”223 
 In a statement on April 8, 2015, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
addressed these issues.224 While recognizing the numerous reports of 
ISIS’s crimes, including genocide, mass executions, rape, and “the 
wanton destruction of cultural property,” the ICC Prosecutor stressed 
that the ICC had no territorial jurisdiction over crimes committed on 
the soil of non-state parties.225 While the ICC could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators who are nationals of state par-
ties, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda reiterated the ICC’s policy to “focus on 
those most responsible for mass crimes.”226 Although a significant 
number of state party nationals have joined the ranks of ISIS,227 the 
ICC Prosecutor stressed that ISIS is “primarily led by nationals of 
                                                                                                                       
 219. Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 15(1). 
 220. Id. art. 12 (“[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the follow-
ing States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
 221. Id. art. 12(2)(b) (recognizing jurisdiction over nationals of party states). 
 222. See SMITH, supra note 106, at 9; Childress, supra note 118; Lister, supra note 118. 
 223. LEILA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2002). 
 224. Statement of Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-08-04-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/QP2G-
US4B]. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id.  
 227. The Prosecutor named Tunisia, Jordan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia as examples where “significant numbers of State 
Party nationals” have joined ISIS. Id.  
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Iraq and Syria,” thereby rendering the prospects of a prosecutor-
initiated prosecution of ISIS leaders “limited.”228 
 c.   United Nations Security Council Referral 
 Finally, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction if “[a] situation . . . is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”229 With its basis in 
Chapter VII, the Security Council’s referral is conditioned upon the 
determination that the referred situation constitutes an imminent 
threat to international peace and security.230 The Security Council 
has twice referred situations to the ICC. It referred the situation in 
Darfur, Sudan to the ICC in March 2005,231 and referred the situa-
tion in Libya in February 2011.232 
 The Security Council has previously rejected referral of the situa-
tion in Syria to the ICC.233 The most significant roadblock for Securi-
ty Council referral is the current positioning of permanent members 
of the Security Council in Syria. For example, France’s allegation 
that Russia committed war crimes in Syria complicates any potential 
Security Council referral.234 Even after that confrontation, however, 
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the Security Council has continued to express concern regarding the 
events in Syria and Iraq, including the continued destruction of cul-
tural heritage in the region. For example, in January 2017, the Secu-
rity Council members issued a statement where it “reiterated their 
condemnation of the destruction of cultural heritage in Syria by 
ISIL/Da’esh” and “underlined the need to bring perpetrators of these 
acts to justice.”235 In addition, the Security Council statement reiter-
ated its continued support for Security Council Resolution 2199, 
which, among other things, takes a stand against allowing terrorist 
groups, including ISIS, to raise funds through the antiquities 
trade.236 
 One question regarding Security Council referral is whether the 
Security Council can make a “limited referral” when it refers a “situ-
ation” to the ICC. For example, whether the Security Council may 
limit its referral to only the situation concerning ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria to the ICC. Given the few matters that the Security Council 
has referred to the ICC, the issue has not been fully developed. How-
ever, the Security Council’s referrals in Darfur and Libya suggest 
that possibility. In its referral involving Libya, the Security Council 
Resolution specifically asserted: 
 4. Decides to refer to the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Court; 
 . . . .  
 6.  Decides that nationals, current or former officials or person-
nel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not 
a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all al-
leged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, 
unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the 
State . . . .237 
The provision notably excludes nationals from states that are not a 
party to the Rome Statute if they are engaged in peacekeeping opera-
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tions in Libya from ICC jurisdiction.238 The Security Council made a 
similar statement in its referral of the situation in Darfur.239 
 The Security Council’s referral of a situation to the ICC may in-
clude limitations ratione personae according to David Scheffer, for-
mer American Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues. 240  As 
Scheffer notes:  
 The power of the Security Council to refer situations enables 
the Council to shape the ICC’s jurisdiction . . . . This means that if 
the Council seizes the opportunity, particularly in a situation that 
has already engaged the Council as a threat to international peace 
and security, to refer a situation to the ICC, then such referral can 
be tailored to minimize the exposure to ICC jurisdiction of military 
forces deployed to confront the threat.241 
Other scholars have called Scheffer’s view regarding the Security 
Council’s power to make a limited referral of a situation to the ICC 
“unpersuasive.”242 As Robert Cryer writes, “The text of Article 13(b), 
in particular when read alongside Article 16, makes it clear that a 
situation may not be limited ratione personae.”243 Moreover, Cryer 
argues that precedent suggests that situations may not be limited. 
Specifically, Uganda referred the situation “concerning the Lord’s 
Resistance Army” in northern Uganda, but the ICC Prosecutor ulti-
mately opened an investigation into events in northern Uganda more 
generally.244 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The phenomenon of the destruction of cultural property may be a 
common theme in history, but the prosecution of perpetrators of such 
destruction is a recent development in international law. Unques-
tionably, ISIS’s destruction of historic monuments in the Middle East 
pales in comparison to some of its other crimes, including the geno-
cide of religious minorities, its televised executions, and its wide-
spread use of rape as a means of war. Still, the failure to prosecute 
members of ISIS for the destruction of cultural and historic sites in 
the Middle East would be a grave omission of international law, and 
such an omission would be particularly insulting given ISIS mem-
bers’ wanton destruction of cultural heritage. By prosecuting ISIS 
members for crimes against culture, the international community can 
reiterate the importance of cultural heritage and, particularly, the 
cultural heritage of the Middle East. As this Article has shown, the 
legal framework is in place for such prosecutions. The only thing left 
is for members of the international community to act so that these 
perpetrators may be brought to justice.   
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